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Introduction
TFP growth is the most important factor explaining long-term income growth (Ashenfleter, 2012) . Changes in total factor productivity have a very important impact on many key aspects of the economy: competitiveness, employment levels or wages. That is why understanding the determinants of TFP growth is of utmost importance. In addition, during the past years, Belgium has experienced a decrease in TFP growth (Biatour et al., 2011 ) and, as i t i s po s si bl e to see i n Fi gur e 1 , i ts per fo rmance i n the ear l y 1 9 9 0 s star ted bei ng disconnected from that of both the EU 15 and Germany. Between 1990 and 2005, Belgium accumulated a handicap with respect to Germany exceeding 10 percentage points; and of 5 percentage points with respect to the EU15. 
Source EUKLEMS database
Such a trend is raising many questions about the underlying reasons of such a puzzling decline. With this paper we take a firm-level perspective and we analyse how changes in the composition of the workforce can affect TFP dynamics at the level of the firm. We are particularly interested in three types of phenomena. The first is the ageing of the available workforce; the second the increasing participation of women in the labour market and the third that of rise of the educational attainment of workers. The fact that Belgium' workforce is ageing stems from well-documented and abundantly commented demographic changes 1 : the share of workers aged 50 and more increased from 18% in 1980 to 21% in 2005 while the share of workers with less than 35 years decreased from more than 30% in 1980 to about 20% in 2005. 2 Such a trend is likely to remain stable for the foreseeable future and it might be boosted in the coming years, in order to comply with EU recommendations. 3 To alleviate the rising cost of old-age publicly funded pension schemes, the Belgian authorities will keep trying expanding (the currently relatively low) employment rate among those aged 50-64. 4 The economic question that is related to the TFP growth issue is that of contribution of this particular category of workers to the production process. In particular, can old workers contribute to the increase in productivity of firms? Can they provide the complementary skills needed for economic success?
Another important socio-demographic trend is the increasing participation of older women into the labour market, leading to a feminization of ageing. The share of older women into productive activities almost doubled passing from more than 3% in 1980 to 6% in 2005. 5 As pointed out by Peracchi & Welch (1994) the relative contribution of older women to TFP growth can be influenced by the higher willingness new cohorts to participate to labour market and by their time spent in productive activities.
Finally, it is important to investigate the connection between TFP performance and the composition of firms' workforce in terms of (rising) educational attainment. Over the 2002-2011 period, private firms located in Belgium have experienced a marked rise of their share of tertiary-educated workers. On average, the share of 2-year-college-educated workers has increased from 17.9% to 19.2% and the share of university-educated employees from 7.4% to 8% (Vandenberghe & Lebedinski, 2013) . The dominant view among economists is that in advanced (or frontier) economies like Belgium, productivity gains should be driven by the expansion of higher/tertiary education.
Each of these three phenomena raises crucial issues that have received little attention so far from the empirical literature. Many existing studies look at the consequence of ageing population in terms of higher dependency rates and rising social security costs (Gruber & Wise, 2004) . Another strand of the literature on ageing examines the retirement behaviour of older individuals (Mitchell & Fields, 1984) and its determinants by gender; for example how non-economic factors (i.e. family considerations) in the decision of older women to retire (Pozzebon & Mitchell, 1989) . True enough, some existing papers consider the impact of age and/or gender on productivity in the Belgian context (Lallemand & . But these works aim primarily at assessing the determinants of labour productivity (or wages), 6 not TFP. The shift from labour productivity to TFP measurement is important. The dynamics of labour productivity can result from changes in the capital-labour ratio, without reflecting changes in the underlying overall ability to use labour and capital input. Economists with a focus on growth thus prefer TFP as a productivity concept, despite the problems arising from its measurement.
As to education, it is quite surprising that most economists have neglected the level of the firm to study the education-productivity relationship. There exists substantial evidence, based on the analysis of individual data, that general education (schooling) increases wages. Card (1999) for instance, summarizes various Mincer-inspired studies and concludes that the impact of a year of schooling on wages is about 10%. Similar results exist for Belgium (de la Croix & Vandenberghe, 2004 ) and many other OECD countries, pointing at slightly lower returns. The puzzling element of that micro level approach is that productivity is never measured or estimated. It is inferred from variation of wages under the assumption that wage differences must reflect labour productivity differences. And, again, the (implicit) dependent variable is labour productivity, not TFP. Macroeconomists focus more on TFPrelated dimensions (e.g. GDP per head). They analyse country-level time series, and find some evidence in support of the idea that the continuous expansion of education has contributed positively to productivity (Krueger & Lindahl, 2001) . But at that level, identification of the proper contribution of education is complicated by the difficulty to separate -using cross-country data over long time periods -the causal effect of education on income, from the wealth-driven surge of the demand for education.
In short, most of the above-mentioned works aim primarily at assessing the determinants of labour productivity (or wages) and focus on labour market issues. Few (if any) studies have examined the consequences of structural socio-demographic changes of the workforce on TFP growth, using firm-level evidence. Our study aims at filling that gap by analysing together the effect on TFP of an increasingly older, feminized and better-educated working force, taking a firm-level perspective.
Our analysis primarily uses firm-level data covering Belgium private economy over the 1998-2006 period. These data contain good-quality information about firms' performance and the composition of their workforce. Our work takes a sequential path: we start by focusing on the age dimension and simply control for the gender structure (i.e share of female workers); and indirectly for the overall skill mix of the firm, using proxies like the share of blue-collar workers and the cohort of birth of workers; in a second step we introduce separately the gender and educational dimensions of ageing and finally we focus on all three dimensions together. We base the analysis on the Hellerstein & Neumark (1995) framework and we take all necessary steps to correctly measure TFP and avoid possible endogeneity concerns. Our results show that most of the TFP slowdown observed in Belgium is driven by the ageing process, with the old categories of workers contributing to TFP growth less than the other ones. This effect does not have a gender bias and the increased educational attainment does not counterbalance the negative effect of the ageing process in a significant way. Moreover, the negative effect of ageing tends to be quite symmetric across different industries and regions as well as across domestic and foreign owned firms and multinationals and nonmultinationals. Therefore, the negative effect of ageing does not come from industry or regional differences, and it is not influenced by possible different managerial practices of foreign owned and multinational firms. In the final section, we take a more macroeconomic stance, in the sense that we try to quantify the aggregate impact of ageing on TFP growth, both retrospectively (back to the early 1990s) and prospectively (from now until 2040). The key idea is to use the firm-level estimated contributions to TFP growth of different age groups, and apply them observed and projected values (covering the period 1991 to 2040) of the labour shares by age for the whole country. The main result is that ageing-related TFP loss is substantial, with a -4.5 percentage points loss in terms of cumulative growth over the 1991-2013 period. And we estimate that, by 2023, that cumulative loss could reach -7 percentage points.
These results pose challenges for policy makers in order to stem the potential negative influence of a continuing ageing society on productivity growth and rises concerns on the possible consequences of the recent policies trying to rise further the employment rate of old workers. 7 Demographic data show that older individuals' share of the total working age population will keep expanding until the mid-2020s. More importantly, Belgium will not be able to fulfil its EU 2020 commitment without rapidly boosting the employment rate of its older citizens. Therefore, more research is needed to better understand the mechanisms governing the negative relationship between age and productivity and offer to policy makers new insights aimed at fighting the productivity decline.
The structure of the paper is the following: in the Section 2 we present the HellersteinNeumark framework used in the paper; in Section 3 we describe the data and provide some descriptive statistics; in Section 4 we present the key econometric results; Section 5 contains the results of a simulation exercise aimed at estimating the magnitude of the overall negative impact of ageing on TFP growth, using 1991-2040 population and employment rate data/projections. Section 6 concludes.
Methodology

Basic model
Consider a labour-augmented Cobb-Douglas technology specified for a firm i in year t: 
Growth specification and accounting for firm fixed effects
Now, since we focus our analysis on TFP growth, a further critical step consists of resorting to the growth-equivalent of [4] (i.e. lag T differences of logs, or log of ratio of Y it to its lagged T values).
This specification sets the TFP growth rate as function of the growth rate of it . Hence, computing the evolution over the years of it is a direct way to capture the sensitivity of TFP growth to changes of the structure of the labour force between the beginning and the end of the panel (more on this in Section 5).
Note also that this growth specification leads to the elimination of the firm fixed effects: i.e. initial level of TFP A i0 and i (as it -it-T = it -it-T ). This transformation can be crucial to account for time-invariant firm-level unobservables, in particular the propensity of workers of different type (i.e. age, gender…) to distribute unevenly across firms/sectors that intrinsically diverge in terms of their level of productivity/TFP.
Simultaneity bias and two-step estimation
So far, we have assumed a two-term structure for the error term. But many econometricians would recommend considering the possibility of a three-component error term.
In this case, the ordinary least squares (OLS) sample-error term potentially consists of i) an unobservable firm fixed effect i ; ii) a short-term shock it (whose evolution may correspond to a first-order Markov chain, causing a simultaneity bias), and is observed by the firm (but not by the econometrician) and (partially) anticipated by the firm, and, iii) a purely random shock it .
As explained above, the parameter i in [6] represents firm-specific characteristics that are unobservable but driving TFP level such as: the vintage of capital in use, the overall stock of human capital, firm-specific managerial skills and location-driven comparative advantages. These might be correlated with the labour force structure of the firm's workforce, biasing OLS results. More educated workers for instance might be underrepresented among plants built a long time ago that use older technology. However, as stated above, the panel structure of our data allows for the estimation of models that eliminate these fixed effects (FE).
This said, another challenge is to go around the simultaneity bias (Griliches & Mairesse, 1995) caused by short-term shock it . The economics underlying that concern is intuitive. In the short run, firms could be confronted to productivity deviations, it ; say, a lower turnover, itself the consequence of a missed sales opportunity. Contrary to the econometrician, firms may know about it (and similarly about its short-term dynamics). An anticipated downturn could translate into a recruitment freeze, and possibly also, into a multiplication of layoffs. A recruitment freeze affects presumably younger and more educated workers, and translates into falling share of more educated workers during negative spells, creating a positive correlation between more educated workers' share and productivity, thereby leading to overestimated estimates of their productivity (when resorting to OLS or even FE estimates). Equation [6] suggests estimating a model where the dependent variable is the (estimated) TFP, following a two-stage strategy. The first stage consists of estimating the log of TFP as the residual of the regression of output on capital and total labour:
It is at this stage that one can control for the presence of it. We follow here the strategy of Olley & Pakes (1996) , then developed by Levinsohn where the error term only consists of the random term, plus the firm fixed effect. The latter can easily be accounted for when turning the TFP growth specification [9] . The dependent variable is not directly observed, but can be estimated as the residual of a regression of total output on capital (growth) and total labour (growth). And the residuals (in levels or growth rates) can then be regressed on it .and the labour share it contains
Data
In this section we describe the data used for the analysis and present some descriptive statistics. The data we use in this paper consist of a panel of about 9,000 firms with more than 20 employees located in Belgium and representing all sectors of the private economy -with the exclusion of agriculture & mining -for the period running from 1998 to 2006. The advantage of using this time span is that it does not include the recent recession, and so, its potentially atypical impact on TFP performances. The data come from the Bel-first dataset and includes information on sector, location, size, capital, labour and value added, the average education attainment of the workforce and details on the ownership nationality and the multinational status. The information on the structure of the labour force comes from the Carrefour database (i.e. social security registers). From this source we get individual-level information on age, gender and blue-collar versus white-collar status of the workers. We aggregate this information at firm level and merge it with Bel-first data, using firms' unique identifiers. Therefore, the resulting firm-level panel contains information on the age, gender and educational attainment of the workers employed by the firms. Note that educational attainment as such is only available at firm-level in the Bel-first data, while age, gender and blue/while-collar status exist at individual level in the Carrefour data. The consequence is that it not possible to compute workforce shares at firm level that interact educational attainment with age and gender. That is why we proxy education using the white/blue collar status and interact it with the two other dimensions. We provide evidence that this this approximation is reasonable. In the following we describe the other features of the data. Table 1 contains the means by year of the key variables used in the analysis. The last two columns (age mean; age standard deviation) suggest that ageing was already taking place between 1998 and 2006, and also that age heterogeneity was on the rise. Table 2 contains the breakdown of the workforce in 7 age groups (those used in the HN share-based specification used in our econometric analysis). It confirms the systematic reduction of the shares of workers aged less than 35; and, in parallel, the rise those of workers aged 40 and more. 
Ageing
Feminization of ageing
The second point we raise in this paper is that the workforce is not only becoming older, but also more female. Figure 2 shows that, in Belgium in general, the employment rates of women aged more than 55 years increased faster than that of men of the same age category. This trend is likely to continue in the future for many reasons; one of them being simply the size of the current employment rate gender gap among the older segments of the working age population characterizing Belgium (and many other European countries) ( Figure  3 ). Turning to our firm-level data, Table 3 shows that older women represent a growing share of the workforce of the Belgian private economy during the period 1998-2006. This is especially true for the category of workers aged more than 50, as shown by the last two columns of Table 3 . 
Older but better-educated workers
The third point we raise in this paper is that the workforce is getting more and more educated. Table 4 shows the age and the share of women increases together with a decrease in the share of blue-collar workers and a consequent increase of the average number of years spent in education. While the increase in the share of old workers might be compromising the capacity of firms to generate productivity gains, we expect the rising educational attainment to work in the opposite direction. Indeed, there is extensive evidence, based on the estimation of Mincerian equations, that better-educated individuals earn more. To the extent that wages are informative about productivity, more educated people should contribute more to increasing productivity. Some macroeconomists, analysing cross-country time series, also support the idea that the continuous expansion of education has contributed positively to growth. 
Econometric results
Ageing
We start with the econometric analysis of ageing, leaving aside for the moment the two other structural trends of interest. The results are estimated using non-linear least squares due to the non-linearity of the problem and the need of estimating the substitutability parameter of our CES-within-Cobb-Douglas model. Our results are shown in All our results convey the idea that workers older than 40 years are less productive and contribute negatively to TPF and TFP growth. The inferred marginal productivities (that we report at the bottom of Table 5 ) -particularly those for the growth specifications -show that relative marginal productivities decline regularly with age, even when we control for the share of women, the share of blue-collars workers and cohort of birth (with the last two variables proxying for education). Model [3] suggests that workers aged 45-49 are 6.6 percentage points less productive than those aged 35-39. Those aged 50-54 appear 25 percentage points less productive and the productivity handicap is estimated to be 32.5 percentage points for those aged 55+. These numbers tend to be very similar across the different specifications. Note that the results obtained with the level specification are much less trustworthy, as there is no control for firm fixed effects, which tend to capture agebased assortative matching (i.e. the propensity of young/older workers to concentrate in firms that are intrinsically less/more productive). The comparisons of growth vs. level equation results suggests that this phenomenon is particularly important among younger workers: they appear much more productive when one takes a growth (i.e. "within" firm) perspective. Note finally that our results for the growth specification deliver estimate for the age elasticity of substitution (i.e. 1/(1-)) that ranges from 2.2 to 4.8, in line with what is be found in the literature (Card & Lemieux, 2001 ). -1
Ageing and gender
As stated above, another important trend is the increasing participation of older women into the labour market leading to a feminization of ageing. How does that affect TFP performance for Belgium? We investigate this question by examining the role of the age and gender structure of the workforce on TFP growth. Table 6 contains the results for model [3] where the total workforce is split into the 7 age groups and the 2 genders. Please note that the reference category is represented by the male workers aged 35-39.
Results in Table 6 convey the idea that men older than 45 are less productive and contribute negatively to TFP growth. This is in line with the results of Section 4.1. The retrieved/inferred marginal productivities (that we report at the bottom of Table 6 ) show a regular decline with age beyond 45. As to older women, Table 6 shows that both the estimated 's and the implied marginal productivities tend to be more or less in line with that of old men. If anything, it is for younger women that there seems to be a productivity handicap affecting TFP growth. The gender productivity/TFP gap turns out to be statistically significant only for women aged less than 50. In other words, we do not find any significant gender bias in the ageing process affecting TFP. -1
Ageing and educational attainment
In this section we analyse whether the rising educational attainment of workers has an effect on TFP. Indeed, we can examine the role of the age and blue/white collar structure of the workforce on TFP growth using the same HN framework. Table 7 contains the results for model [3] where the total workforce is split into 7 age groups and blue/white-collar status. Please note that the reference category is represented by the white-collar workers aged 35-39. Results in Table 7 suggest an absence of real difference between blue-and white-collars across the ages. If anything, it is for the category of white collars aged 55-64 that age leads to statistically significant larger productivity handicap. The inferred marginal productivities show for blue collars aged 55-64 a handicap of 28 percentage points. The equivalent figure for their white-collar peers is above 50 percentage points. -1
Age, gender and white/blue-collar status
In this section we combine together all the dimension analysed above. Table 8 contains the results for model [3] where the total workforce is split into 3 age groups and blue/white collar status (the reference category being the male white collars aged 35-39). We need to reduce to 3 age bands: <30, 30-49 (the reference category) and 50-64, in order to avoid high dimensionality problems and the loss of precision of estimators that comes with it.
The results are reported in Table 8 and they are qualitatively in line with those presented above. Older workers age 50-64 contribute negatively to TFP growth regardless of their gender and blue/white collar status. Implied marginal productivities reported at the bottom of Table 8 indicate that older blue collar women are 32 percentage points less productive at than white-collar prime age men (the reference group). The handicap of older male blue collar is estimated to be of 23 percentage points and that of older white-collar female and male workers of respectively 44 and 28 percentage points. However, these handicaps tend to diverge in magnitude between the different categories of older workers (male versus female, blue-collar versus while collar), none of the differences are statistically significant. Therefore, the key determinant of TFP slowdown is the ageing process. This does not have a gender bias and it is not counterbalanced by the increased education of the workforce. -1
Industry, Region, Foreign Ownership and Multinational Status
After having analysed the average effect of the workforce structural changes on TFP growth, in this section we check whether the effect of ageing varies across different types of firms. In particular, we consider the (broadly-defined) industry, their region, the foreign ownership and the multinational status of the firm.
-Industry
Results in Table 9 replicate the analysis focused on age (model [3]), but with a breakdown by broadly-defined sectors: manufacturing versus services. 9 The aim is to assess the potentially divergent effect of age on TFP across different industries. This is because ageing might matter less for productivity in a service-based economy than in one where manufacturing dominates. Results do not completely validate this assumption. Marginal productivity by age profiles, as reported at the bottom of Table 9 are relatively similar. Yet, we find that older workers aged 55-64 have a productivity handicap of 50 percentage points in manufacturing, whereas that handicap is only of 24 percentage point for those who work in the service industry. Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using non-linear least squares, with standard errors robust to firm-level clustering. Source: Bel-first; Carrefour * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
(a):
-1 -Region Table 10 shows the results of the estimation of model [3] for each region of Belgium. The idea is that different regions might experience dissimilar ageing patterns, thus leading TFP growth to be different across firms based in different regions. Results show that the two biggest regions, Flanders and Wallonia, do not register any significant difference when considering the negative effect of ageing on TFP, while firms based in Brussels shows that not only "old" workers perform poorly, but also the "young" ones. -1
-Foreign Ownership and Multinational Status
In Table 11 we replicate the same exercise distinguishing among firms that are owned by foreign investors 10 and those that have affiliates abroad. 11 The idea is that foreign owned firms and firms that have affiliates abroad might be able to better master the ageing problem by transmitting from abroad the knowledge and the processes to better use the ageing human capital with respect to the domestic and non-multinational ones. Results in Table 11 show that this is not the case: both domestic firms and foreign owned and multinational and non-multinationals suffer similarly from the ageing process. This can be interpreted as evidence that the ageing problem is not caused by bad managerial practices of Belgian firms that lead firms to do not value the "old" workers. Rather, this is evidence that the ageing process is affecting evenly different types of firms, regardless of their international activity. 
Quantifying the aggregate impact of ageing on TFP growth.
In this final section, we take a more macroeconomic stance, in the sense that we try to quantify the aggregate impact of ageing on TFP growth in Belgium, both retrospectively (back to the early 1990s) and prospectively (from now until 2040).
The method
Referring to the growth specification of our model, the idea is to compute the value of TFP loss (in percentage points) driven by the gradual decline of ln ( it / it-1 ) in
The key idea is to use estimated 's, and (stemming from the estimation of model ; j=1… n age categories
The Data
The age labour shares (S t j ) we use here -and to which we apply (firm-level) estimated 's, and -cover the period 1991 to 2040; a much larger period that the one examined so far using firm-level Bel-first data. We calculate these shares, using i) population-by-age data published by Statistics Belgium; 13 and ii) employment rate by age computed by the OECD using LFS 14 surveys. The latter only covers the period 1991-2013. This means that we need to formulate assumptions regarding the evolution of the employment rate by age over the period 2014-2040. This will be discussed in detail subsequently.
The first element to be considered is the evolution of the age structure of the working age population ( This said, demographics is only one part of the full story. What really matters is the evolution of the employment shares. And these are driven by the product of population shares by (relative) employment rates. 15 For the period 1991-2013, all data needed are available. The resulting employment shares by age are reported in Figure 6 . Beyond 2013, as mentioned earlier, assumptions need to be formulated about the possible evolution of employment rates, on average and by age group. We use here three scenarios (Table 12) : the first (Scena1) assumes that employment rates by age will remain what they were in 2013; the second (Scena2) corresponds to realisation of the EU2020 objective of an employment rate of 75% for individuals aged 20-65. We assume that this objective will be attained primarily by raising the employment rate of individuals aged 50 and more. More precisely, we assume that employment rate of individuals aged 50-54 will rise (linearly) from 75% in 2013 to 80% in 2020, and the one of individuals aged 55-64 from 42% to 80%. In the third scenario (Scena3 ) we assume that i t wil l take an extra 1 0 year s to r each the E U20 2 0 tar get. Technically, this simply means that individuals aged 50 and more will attain the 80% is the share of the (working age) population of age j, ER t j the employment rate applicable to that age group, and ER t the overall employment rate of the working age population. Note that the latter can be computed as the weighted sum of age-specific employment rates, where the weight are the corresponding P t j . employment rate threshold only in 2030. Source: Bel-first; Carrefour.
. The evolution of employment shares by age underpinning our analysis is displayed in the different panels of Figure 6 . In the upper panel, we freeze employment rates to their 2013 level. And in this case, we logically get projections that are driven only by the demographics. Quite logically, we get curves that replicate what was visible in Figure 5 , beyond 2013. If we focus for a moment on the 1991-2013 period, it is quite striking to observe the intensity of the ageing process. This has been simultaneously driven by both the sharp fall of the share of young workers and the rise of the shares of workers aged 50 and more. The latter increase goes beyond what demographics dictates, and it highlights the prominent role of higher employment rate among older individuals since 1990 for the 50-54 category, and since 2000 for the older individuals. As to the future, under the first scenario (no further increase of older employment rates), Figure 6 (upper panel) shows that the ageing process of the workforce should peak rather soon than late. The other two scenarios -where we assume that the employment rate of old workers will rise in order to fulfil the European target of a 75% overall employment rate -show that the ageing of the workforce will become even more pronounced, with a sharp rise of the share of individuals aged 55-64. While scenario 1 predicts the share of workers aged 55-64 to attain 15% by the year 2023; scenario 2 suggests that the latter could reach 25% the same year. Scenario 3 leads to similar conclusions, except that the 25% peak is postponed by a few years, reflecting the more gradual rise of the employment rate among individuals aged 55-64. 
Conclusions
This paper examines the role of different structural changes in the composition of the workforce on the TFP dynamics. In particular we focus on three main phenomena. The first is the ageing of the workforce; the second is the increased participation of women in the labour market and the third is the increased educational attainment of workers. Using data on Belgian firms for the period 1998-2006 we show that most of the TFP slowdown observed in Belgium is driven by the ageing process, with the old categories of workers contributing to TFP growth less than the other ones. This effect does not have a gender bias and the increased educational attainment does not counterbalance the negative effect of the ageing process in a significant way. This effect tends to be quite homogeneous across firms pertaining to different industries, regions and to different international involvement.
Finally, when combining our firm-level results on ageing with country-level demographic and employment data, we estimate that, over the 1991-2013 period, ageing workforces may have already dented cumulative TPF growth by -4.5 percentage points. Simulations indicate that this cumulative loss could rise to -7 percentage points by 2020-2030. A bit surprisingly, this pattern is not so much dictated by Belgium's demography (the ageing of the working age population should peak around 2023). Rather, we show that it is primarily driven by Belgium's commitment/obligation to attaining a 75% overall employment rate. Reaching that target by 2020 -or perhaps more realistically 2030 -will almost inevitably require a sharp rise of the current 55-64 employment rate. 
